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INTERNATIONAL HEALTH EMERGENCIES IN 
FAILED AND FAILING STATES 
CHIARA GIORGETTI* 
ABSTRACf 
Global health emergencies, particularly those occurring in Jailed and Jailing 
States, can become threats to the stability of the international community. This 
Article assesses the international mechanisms available to respond to such 
emergencies. After defining global health emergencies, it discusses the implica-
tions of global outbreaks in Jailed and Jailing States. It then examines the role 
played by the World Health Organization in controlling global health emergen-
cies, with particular reference to the newly amended 2005 International Health 
Regulations and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. Finally, it 
explores the role of other international organizations, including the United 
Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, in addressing global health emergencies in Jailed or 
Jailing States. "While no comprehensive and mandatory action plan exists to deal 
with global health emergencies, the tools developed by the World Health Organiza-
tion and other international organizations are proving to be effective in dealing 
with global health emergencies so Jar. The lack of enforcement measures seems to 
be compensated by cooperation and voluntary actions by Member States, and 
significant non-State actor involvement. The lingering question is how to ensure 
that actions are taken in a timely and comprehensive manner in all global health 
emergencies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization and the spread of disease have made public health a 
matter of international concern. This is particularly true in situations of 
trans-boundary health emergencies, as demonstrated by the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Ebola epidemics, and more 
recently by the cholera outbreak in post-earthquake Haiti ··and the 
outbreaks of H1N1 and H3N2 influenza. 1 Often, these emergencies 
cannot be addressed exclusively by one State, but must instead be 
addressed by the international community as a whole. The difficulties 
of successfully addressing trans-boundary health emergencies are com-
pounded in situations of failed and failing States, where governments 
lack the power to control their territories and populations. 2 
This Article explores mechanisms available to respond to public 
health emergencies in failed and failing States, with the goal of 
assessing their effectiveness and identifying existing challenges. First, 
the Article defines health emergencies and State failure. Next, it 
examines the role played by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
controlling global health emergencies, in particular through the Inter-
national Health Regulations (IHR) and the Global Outbreak Alert and 
Response Network (GOARN). Finally, it discusses the role of other 
international organizations, including the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitar-
ian Affairs (OCHA), in global health emergencies in failed or failing 
1. See generally Infectious Diseases, WORLD TRADE 0RG., http://who.int/topics/infectious_ 
diseases/en/index.hunl (last visited June 15, 2013); Influenza, WoRLD TRADE ORG., http:/ I 
www.wto.int/topics/influenza/en/ (last visited June 15, 2013). For SARS and H1Nl, see infra 
Parts I and N.A.2. 
2. On the issue of state failure, see Chiara Giorgetti, A Principled Approach to State Failure 
(2009). 
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States. While no comprehensive and mandatory action plan exists to 
deal with global health emergencies, the tools developed by WHO and 
other international organizations have often proven to be effective in 
dealing with global health emergencies. The lack of binding enforce-
ment measures seems to have been compensated by voluntary activities 
and cooperation by Member States and non-State actors. The question 
that still needs to be resolved, however, is how to ensure that actions are 
taken in a timely and comprehensive manner in all global health 
emergencies, even when the State at the center of the crisis is reluctant 
or unable to provide assistance. In these situations, IHR 2005 and 
GOARN can be used symbiotically to ensure a coordinated response to 
health emergencies in failed and failing States. In this way, WHO can 
play a fundamental role to ensure that health emergencies are detected 
and temporary recommendations are approved and implemented. It is 
important to ensure that WHO acts within its given powers and 1s 
provided the appropriate support and tools to carry out its mandate. 
II. HEALTH EMERGENCIES AS GLOBAL SECURI1Y ISSUES 
Health has become a central topic of international law. Its impor-
tance is recognized in several international and regional instruments, 
such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.3 The UN Charter cites the need 
to collaborate on health issues in several articles,4 and several interna-
3. See, e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) art. 25, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, 
Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 16,June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 
217; see also D. P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIALS ON AND ANALYSIS OF 
GLOBAL HEALTH jURISPRUDENCE 277-331 (2000). 
4. Article 13 states "The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations 
for the purpose of (b) promoting international co-operation in the ... health fields". U.N. Char-
ter art. 13 'l! 1. Article 55 affirms "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and 
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote: (b) solutions of international economics, social, health." /d. at art. 55. Article 57 further 
states: "The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having 
wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in ... health, and related 
fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provision 
of Article 63." /d. at art. 57 'l[ 1. Finally, Article 62 states "The Economic and Social Council may 
make or initiate studies and reports with respect to ... health and related matters and may make 
recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of 
the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned." /d. at art. 62 'l[ 1. 
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tional organizations now include health-related mandates, including 
WHO and UNICEF.5 
Public health has increasingly become a global issue. Faster, easier, 
and cheaper transportation methods have resulted in a phenomenal 
increase in the movement of people and goods,6 and new conserva-
tion technologies have improved the international trade of perishable 
goods.7 These developments have made it easier for diseases to 
spread faster and to more distant locations.8 Indeed, easier movement 
of people and goods has facilitated not only the spread of infec-
tious diseases, but also their emergence and reemergence in both 
humans and animals.9 Accordingly, global health10 has become an 
important concern for the international community. Globalization has, 
to a certain extent, undermined the ability of one State, acting alone, to 
protect its people from the spread of infectious diseases. As a result, it 
has become clear that only collective efforts can efficiently address 
5. See infra Part IV. WHO "is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the 
United Nations system." See About WTO, WoRLD TRADE 0RG., http:/ /www.who.int/about/en/ (last 
visited june 15, 2013). Similarly, "improving the health of the world's children is a core UNICEF 
objective." Focus Areas, Health, UNICEF, http:/ /www.unicef.org/health/index.html (last visited 
June 15, 2013). 
6. For example, the World Trade Organization reports that the total value of exports 
increased to 18,323,000 million in 2012, from 2,034,000 million in 1980. See International Trade and 
Market Access Data, WoRLD TRADE ORG., www.wto.org/statistics (last visited july 17, 2013). Similarly, 
the World Bank calculated that overnight visitors to France went from 60 million in 1995 to 81 
million in 2011, and from 31 million to 46 million in Italy for the same period. International 
Tourism, Number of Arrivals, WoRLD BANK, http:/ /data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.ARVL 
(last visited june 15, 2013). 
7. William Coyle et. al., Transportation Technology and the Rising Share of U.S. Perishable Food 
Trade, in USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, CHANGING STRUCfURE OF GLOBAL Fooo CONSUMPTION 
AND TRADE 31 (Anita Regmi ed., 2001) (explaining that by reducing delivery times, maintaining 
product quality, and reducing shipping costs, advances in transportation technology greatly 
facilitated trade of perishable food products). 
8. Board of Global Health, Impact of Globalization on Infectious Disease Emergence and 
Control: Exploring the Consequences and Opportunities 21-48 (Knobler et al. eds., 2006). 
9. See generally World Health Organization, World Health Report 2008-A Safer Future: 
Global Public Health Security in the 21" Century (2007), available at http:/ /www.who.int/whr/ 
2007 I en/index.html. 
10. The term 'global health' is preferred to 'international health' because, as St0re et al. 
explain, '"global health' is rapidly overtaking the paradigm of 'international health' as the 
organizing principle for health cooperation. While the latter term focuses on relations among 
sovereign nations, the concept of global health encompasses health affairs within and among 
nations-states, as well as transnational challenges not defined by political borders. Global health 
thus recognizes multiple actor groups in the production of health, including but not limited to 
national government."]. G. St0re et al., Health and Security for a Global Century, in GLOBAL HEALTH 
CHALLENGES FOR HUMAN SECURI1Y 67-68 (L. Chen, et al. eds., 2003). 
1350 [Vol. 44 
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
public health emergencies. 
Deadly diseas'es like tuberculosis, malaria, and cholera are still wide-
spread in many regions of the world. 11 Some of their pathogens are 
becoming drug-resistant, and thus more difficult to cure and isolate.12 
Some diseases are spreading into previously disease-free regions. 13 
Moreover, new infectious diseases, such as SARS and Ebola hemor-
rhagic fever, 14 typically have trans-boundary effects, and thus can only 
be properly handled by the coordinated actions of multiple national 
and international actors. As global health expert Professor David Fidler 
concludes, "most public health experts agree that the distinction 
between national and international public health is no longer relevant 
because globalization has enabled pathogenic microbes to spread 
illness and death globally."15 
Finally, the connection between national security and health has also 
become apparent. 16 Significantly, States have begun to identify certain 
11. See, e.g., Global Health Obseroatory, WoRLD HEALrn 0RG., http:/ /www.who.int/gho/malaria/ 
en/index.html (last visited Jun. 13, 2013) (globally, an estimated 3.3 billion people were at risk of 
malaria in 2011); see also WHO, WoRLD HEALrn STATisncs 2012 86-95 (2012) (providing statistics 
on selected infectious diseases), available at http:/ /apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44844/ 
1/9789241564441_eng.pdf. 
12. See, e.g., Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis (MDR-TB), WoRLD HEALTH 0RG., http://www. 
who.int/tb/challenges/mdr/en/ (last visited Jun. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Multidrug-Resistant Tu-
berculosis] ("anti-tuberculosis drug resistance is a major public health problem that threatens 
progress made in TB care and control worldwide"). 
13 .. For example, cases of West Nile fever were recently diagnosed in New York City. Ad-
ditionally, a new wave of tuberculosis-which is resistant to usual medications-has been found 
in Europe and in the United States. Denghi Hemorrhagic Fever is now considered endemic in fifty 
countries, a significant rise from the only nine countries considered endemic before 1970. See 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, Dir. Gen., WORLD HEALrn ORG., Failed States and Global Security: How 
Health Can Contribute to a Safer World 6 (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http:/ /www.brookings.edu/ I 
media/ events/2002/09 /26global-health. 
14. For a recent outbreak report, see Joe Sterling, Ebola Outbreak Kills 10 in Congo, CNN 
(Aug. 21, 2012), http:/ /www.cnn.com/2012/08/21/world/africa/congo-ebola. 
15. David D. Fidler, The Globalisation of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and 
International Relations, as quoted in FIDLER, supra note 3, at 16. 
16. There is a new growing literature on this phenomenon. See, e.g., GLOBAL HEALTH 
CHALLENGES FOR HUMAN SECURIIT (L. Chen etal. eds., 2003) (especially]. G. St121re etal., Health and 
Security for a Global Century; and D. L. Heymann, Evolving Infectious Disease Threats to National 
and Global Security; Jack C. Chow, Health and International Security, 19 WASH. Q. 2, 63-77 (1996); 
J. B. Tucker, & R. P. Kadlec, Infectious Disease and National Security, 29 STRATEGIC REv. 12-20 (2001). 
Heymann affirms: "This principle [of global public health security] has evolved in response to 
three concurrent trends. First, the highly publicized resurgence of the infectious disease threat 
illustrated the vulnerability of all nations to outbreaks and epidemics, often of new or unusual 
diseases. Second, the impact of AIDS on sub-Saharan Africa demonstrated the capacity of an 
emerging disease to destabilize a large geographical region in ways that undermine the very 
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diseases as national security threats and have developed measures to 
halt and control the spread of these diseases as part of their foreign 
policies.17 For example, in 2000, the Clinton administration for the first 
time declared AIDS a threat to the United States' national security and 
global stability18 and mandated the U.S. National Security Council to 
develop an appropriate response. 19 President Obama shared the same 
understanding of the HIV I AIDS epidemic through a President's Emer-
gency Plan for AIDS Relief.20 UNAIDS, the joint UN program on 
infrastructures needed for governance. Third, a reconsideration of the determinants of national 
security broadened the perception of what constitutes a security threat in the post-Cold War era, 
making space to accommodate infectious diseases--at feast in their most internationally disrup-
tive forms." Heymann, supra, at 106; see also Javed Siddiqi, WoRLD HEALTH AND WORLD PoLmcs: 
THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND THE UN SYsTEM (1995). 
17. See US: Aids is Security Threat, BBC (May 1, 2000), http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ 
americas/731706.stm; see also Barton Gellman, AIDS Is Declared Threat to US National Security, 
WASH. PoST (Apr. 30, 2000), http:/ /www.commondreams.org/headlines/043000-02.htm. 
18. Heymann noted: "Several recent events suggest that emerging and epidemic-prone 
diseases are being taken seriously as a threat to national and global security. In an unprecedented 
step, a US government-supported study concluded in 1995 that emerging and reemerging 
infectious diseases, especially AIDS, constituted a national security threat and foreign policy 
challenge. In 1996, the US Department of Defense established the Global Emerging Infectious 
Surveillance and Response System, based on a network of domestic and overseas military 
laboratories, as an explicit acknowledgement that emerging disease can threaten military person-
nel and their families, can reduce military readiness, and present a risk to US national security. 
The threat posed by microbial agents to the security of the US was further acknowledged in 2000 
by an equally unprecedented report from the US Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelli-
gence Council. Citing the 'staggering' and 'destabilizing' number of deaths caused by AIDS in 
sub-Saharan Africa." David L. Heymann, The Evolving Infectious Disease Threat: Implications for 
National and Global Security, 4]. HuMAN DEY. 2, 197 (2003); see also HN/AIDS as a Security Issue, 
INT'L CRISIS GRP. (Jun. 19 2001), available at http:/ /www.crisisgroup.org/ /media/Files/africa/ 
HIV-AIDS%20as%20a%20Security%20Issue.pdf. 
19. Following the same path, in his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush 
announced the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a five-year, USD15 billion initiative. See President 
Bush's Global Health Initiatives Are Saving Lives Around the World, THE WHrTE HOUSE, http:// 
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov /infocus/bushrecord/factsheets/ globalhealth.html (last vis-
ited July 17, 2013). Also, the United States has created the role of United States Global AIDS 
Coordinator, presently occupied by Ambassador Eric Goosby. See Ambassador Eric Goosby, Office of 
the Global AIDS Coordinator, available at http:/ /www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/ 
125470.pdf. 
20. Lessons learned from the first decade of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
were assessed by the U.S. Global AIDS Ambassador in July 2012. See U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator 
Ambassador Eric Goosby to Deliver Keynote Remarks at Health Affairs Briefing, U.S. STATE DEP'T (July 9, 
2012), http:/ /www.state.gov./r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07 /194749.htm. 
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HIV I AIDS, also advocates for a global response.21 Simiiarly and more 
broadly, in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document, States 
recognized that "HIV I AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious 
diseases pose severe risks for the entire world and serious challenges to 
the achievement of development goals."22 
These legal, security, and policy developments have made it clear 
that public health has become a matter of international concern, 
one that often cannot be addressed exclusively by one State, but that 
requires action by the international community as a whole. Undoubt-
edly, there is currently a certain degree of collaboration among 
States on some public health matters. Several multilateral organiza-
tions exist at the regional level and collaborate on health issues. 23 
Various international organizations, including WHO and UNICEF,24 
have also assumed coordination and facilitation roles in international 
public health matters. For example, epidemiologists from around the 
world meet periodically at the WHO Headquarters in Geneva to 
identify and recommend the most effective vaccine for the upcoming 
influenza season.25 In addition, several international, national, and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) intervene in support of na-
tional health sectors during humanitarian crises-which often occur in 
21. See Getting to Zero: 2011-2015 Strategy, jOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV I AIDS, 
at 8 (2010), available at http:/ /www.unaids.org/ en/media/unaids/ contentassets/documents/ 
unaidspublication/20 I 0 /jc2034_unaids_strategy _en. pdf. 
22. 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/Res/60/1, Oct. 24, 2005, t 57, available at 
http:/ /unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf. 
23. For example, the Pan American Health Organization. See PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANI-
ZATION, http:/ /www.paho.org/usa/ (last visited june 14, 2013). 
24. UNICEF was established by a Resolution of the UN General Assembly on 11 December 
1946. UNICEF is a semi-autonomous Agency of the UN system. It is headed by a 30-members 
Executive Board and an Executive Director elected by the UN Economic and Social Council. Its 
"purpose is to help developing countries improve the condition of their children and youths. 
It aids country projects, preferably those which form part of national programs of development." 
It assists countries only at the request of their government. See Amos J. Paeslee, UNICEF, in 
ll'<'TERNATIONAL GoVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, Part I, Vol. II, 1398. 
25. Influenza Vaccine Viruses and Reagents, WoRLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ /www.who.int/influenza/ 
vaccines/virus/en/ (last visited Jun. 14, 2013) ("Since 1973, WHO has provided formal recommen-
dation for the composition of influenza vaccines based on the information provided by the WHO 
Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), now the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and 
Response System. High yield candidate vaccine viruses are developed by collaboration of laborato-
ries involved in developing reassortants and WHO Collaborating Centres (CCs)."); see, e.g., 
Recommended Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2013-14 Northern Hemisphere 
Influenza Season, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 21, 2013), http:/ /www.who.int/influenza/vaccines/ 
virus/recommendations/2013_14_north/en/index.html (recommending the content of the tri-
valent vaccine to be used in the 2013-14 influenza season in the northern hemisphere). 
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situations of conflict and State failure-and provide basic health care.26 
However, there are currently no binding general agreements that 
address the problem of global health emergencies, and no agreements 
on comprehensive plans or specific actions in situations of trans-
boundary health emergencies.27 Members of the international com-
munity realized that this lacuna was potentially deeply problematic 
during the game-changing 2002 SARS virus epidemic in China. 
SARS, a serious form of highly contagious viral pneumonia, was first 
diagnosed in Southern China in 2003 and eventually spread to twenty-
seven countries-including Hong Kong, Canada, the Philippines, Rus-
sia, and Spain-allegedly causing 774 deaths.28 The Chinese authori-
ties initially failed to report the new disease to WHO and, in fact, tried 
to conceal its existence. 29 The Chinese government revealed the extent 
of the epidemic only in March 2003, after mounting media and 
political pressure, and after the disease was diagnosed in other coun-
tries.30 At that time, it allowed a WHO team to enter its territory and 
assess the situation for the first time.31 By that point, the alarm caused 
by a new, unknown disease had already spread worldwide, and WHO 
had issued a global alert for the disease.32 WHO was also able to release 
daily updates describing the progress of the epidemic and controlling 
26. These include UNICEF, UNDP, OCHA, the European Commission Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO), US Aid International Development Office ("USAID"), Medicines Sans Frontieres, 
Oxfam, and many others. Their programs, often carried out jointly, typically include the 
establishment of field health clinics and monitor centers, mother-and-child care, provision of 
water and food, vaccination and sanitation campaigns. 
27. See A SAFER FUTURE, supra note 10, at 66. 
28. See D. FIDLER, SARS, GoVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE (2004); Sroere Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), A.D.A.M. MED. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http:/ /www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pubmedhealth/PMH0004460 (last visited july 17, 2013). 
29. SeeYanzhongHuang, The SARS Epidemic and Its Aftermath in China: A Political Perspective, 
in LEARNING FROM SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 
2004), available at. http:/ /www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK92479/ (asserting that "the public 
was kept uninformed about the disease. According to the Implementing Regulations on the 
State Secrets Law regarding the handling of public health-related information, any occurrence of 
infectious diseases should be classified as a state secret before they are "announced by the Ministry 
of Health or organs authorized by the Ministry." In other words, until such time as the Ministry 
chose to make information about the disease public, any physician or journalist who reported on 
the disease would risk being persecuted for leaking state secrets ... A virtual news blackout about 
SARS thus continued well into February [2003]"). 
30. /d. 
31. /d. (stating "WHO experts were invited to China by the Ministry of Health but were not 
allowed to have access to Guangdong until April 2 [2003] "). 
32. See Global Alert and Response (GAR), WORLD HEALTH ORG., tp:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/ 
archive/country/chn/en/ (last visited july 17, 2013). 
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efforts with the support of reports from national health monitor 
systems and several governments.33 WHO issued a travel alert discour-
aging travel to several countries in Asia and to Canada, where the virus 
had already been diagnosed and resulted in casualties. WHO's vigorous 
and coordinated response bore fruit, and by the beginning of July, the 
epidemic had been stopped. 34 
The reactions to the SARS epidemic are instructive for several 
reasons. On the one hand, the initial mishandling of the epidemic by 
the Chinese authorities demonstrated the need for coordinated inter-
vention by international actors in situations of global health emer-
gencies. China's response revealed the limitations of the existing 
emergency control system. In fact, had China declared the emergency 
sooner, the result of the epidemic would have been far less serious, and 
effective control measures could have been implemented much earlier. 
Instead, China designated any news relating to the epidemic as State 
secrets and denied access to outside actors, including WHO and the 
media, for several crucial months.35 This not only aggravated the 
situation, but also epitomized the limitation of the international legal 
system, where little action is allowed without State consent. 
On the other hand, the SARS example also provides some positive 
lessons. First, the international reaction to the spread of SARS demon-
strated that WHO has the ability to successfully manage and control a 
potential global crisis. Second, it proved that the international commu-
nity as a whole can exercise pressure and show cohesion when needed. 
Indeed, information related to the outbreak was reported by individu-
als and non-governmental groups, which alerted other actors in the 
international community.36 WHO then verified the reports and re-
quested more information from the Chinese government.37 Moreover, 
33. /d. 
34. M. Poulin, La Gestion par I'OMS des Situations d'Urgence de Portee Internationale. 
L'example du Syndrome Respiratoire Aigu Severe, AcruALITE ET DROIT INT'L (Nov. 2003), 
availableatwww.ridi.org/adi. 
35. See Huang, supra note 29, at 3 (stating "WHO experts were invited to China by the 
Ministry of Health but were not allowed to have access to Guangdong until April 2 [2003], 8 days 
after their arrival."). 
36. /d. at 4 (stating "Starting on February 11, the Western news media began to aggressively 
report on SARS in China and the government's cover-up of the outbreak. On March 15 [2003], 
the WHO issued its first global warning about SARS. While China's government-<:ontrolled media 
was prohibited from reporting on the warning, the news circulated via mobile phones, e-mail, and 
the Internet. On March 25, 3 days after the arrival of a team of WHO experts, the government for 
the first time acknowledged the spread ofSARS outside ofGuangdong."). 
37. ld. 
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once the epidemic was confirmed, WHO issued several global alerts, 
including travel warnings. 38 This was the first time that such restrictions 
were imposed, and although WHO did not have a clear mandate to 
issue such alerts, Member States generally complied with them.39 
III. HEALTH SYSTEMS IN FAILED AND FAILING STATES 
The SARS epidemic crystallized the consensus within the interna-
tional community that public health emergencies require common 
action. This is particularly necessary in failed and failing States, where 
the threats to the population brought by the spread of viruses, the 
emergence and re-emergence of diseases, and the international secu-
rity implications of health emergencies are magnified. 40 
Many developing countries struggle in their efforts to ensure appro-
priate health standards for their citizens. The conditions of national 
public health systems, especially in certain low-income and highly in-
debted countries, have improved little in the last fifty years.41 In most 
developing countries, social and environmental conditions benefit 
opportunistic microbes.42 Further, several diseases are becoming drug-
resistant, including diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, which 
have developed antimicrobial resistance.43 As a consequence, public 
38. See Global Alert and Response (GAR), WORLD HEALTH ORG., tp:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/ 
archive/country/chn/en/ (last visited July 17, 2013). 
39. See David P. Fidler, Development Involving SARS, International Law, and the Infectious 
Disease Control at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the Worlq Health Assembly, ASIL INSIGHTS, 
June 2003 (note that despite the Canadian government's objection, Toronto was included on the 
list of places where travel was discouraged). 
40. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003--SHAPING THE 
FUTURE ix, (2003) available at http:/ /www.who.int/whr/2003/en/ (noting that "(g]lobal health is 
a study in contrasts. While a baby girl born in Japan today can expect to live for about 85 years, 
a girl born at the sa11,1e moment in Sierra Leone has a life expectancy of 36 years"). 
41. For example, in Somalia, the mortality rate of under-five-years-old children remained 
unchanged between 1983 and 2011 (180 per 1,000 live births). Mortality Rate, Under-5, WORLD 
BANK, http:/ I data.worldbank.org/indicator /SH.DYN .MORT I countries/! W-SO?display=graph 
(last visited July 17, 2013). 
42. David D. Fidler, The Globalisation of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and Interna-
tional &lations, as quoted in FIDLER, supra note 3, at 22. Fidler identifies the following parts for the 
pathology for the globalization of public health in the era of emerging infectious diseases: 
"1. international trade and travel as effective channels for infectious diseases spread; 2. deteriorat-
ing or nonexistent public health capabilities, including the declining effectiveness of antimicro-
bial drugs; 3. the failure of the internationalization of public health; 4. the development of 
unprecedented levels of deeply rooted social, economic, and environmental problems that 
provide pathogenic microbes with fertile conditions." !d. 
43. See Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis, supra note 12. 
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health systems in developing countries remain inadequate and often 
incapable of coping with health emergencies, such as epidemics and 
the discovery of new infectious diseases. 44 
The situation of failing and failed States is particularly daunting. 
Failed States are characterized by an implosion of State structure, 
which results in the incapability of governmental au~horities to per-
form their functions, which include providing security, respecting the 
rule oflaw, exercising control, supplying education and health services, 
and maintaining economic and structural infrastructures.45 Failed 
States are, by definition, unable to provide basic political and social 
goods to their people. Often, their health care systems are all but 
collapsed. 46 Moreover, the spread of disease and new epidemics cannot 
be properly monitored and controlled.47 One of the defining character-
istics of State failure is a State's growing inability to provide basic health 
care, which results in a decline in health indicators like infant mortality 
and life expectancy.48 Based on this definition, former WHO Director-
44. WHO further affirms: "Newly recognized and familiar pathogens have reasserted their 
epidemic potential as: 1. Development gaps have widened, leaving many countries unable to 
provide adequate basic services such as safe water, adequate nutrition, waste disposal and health 
care for their populations. 2. Governmental and public health care systems in many countries have 
collapsed 'due to civil strife and war. 3. Poverty, urbanization and population displacement have 
led to concentration of human populations in conditions that favour major outbreaks (e.g. 
refugee camps, urban slums). 4. Exploitation of pristine environments is exposing human 
populations to new infectious agents. 5. Diseases within animal populations cross into human 
populations. 6. Environmental change may alter the endemicity and transmission patterns of 
pathogens. 7. Ineffective vector control programmes have led to a proliferation of vectors, 
including resistant vector populations. 8. The development of antimicrobial resistance now 
threatens to make once curable diseases incurable. 9. The potential for accelerated spread of 
disease has increased markedly with globalization of travel and trade. 10. The situation is fur-
ther compounded by inappropriate social, political and economic responses to epidemics with 
implementation of misguided measures to control disease spread." WHO Dep't of Communicable 
Disease Surveillance and Response, A Framework for Global Outbreak Alert and Response, WHO/ 
CDS/CSR/2000.2, at I, available at http:/ /www.who.int/ csr /resources/publications/surveillance/ 
whocdscsr2002.pdf. 
45. State failure results from several interlinked causes, both endogenous and exogenous to 
the State. Endogenous causes include corruption, structural weaknesses, and misadministration. 
Exogenous causes include macroeconomic and political policies, foreign interventions either in 
support of those in power' or opposition groups, or decline of foreign financial and political 
support. For an overview of State failure and international law, see GIORGETII, supra note 2. 
46. For relevant health data, see Mortality Rate, Under-5, WORLD BANK, http:/ /data.world-
bank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT /countries/IW-SO?display=graph (last visited july 17, 2013). 
4 7. See Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, WASH. Q., Summer 2002, at 85. 
48. See id.; see also Collapsed States, The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority (I. William Zartman ed., 1995). 
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General, Doctor Gro Brundtland, suggests that almost a third of the 
population of sub-Saharan Africa lives in countries that can be de-
fined as weak and failed States, or that are ravaged by complex 
emergencies. 49 
The consequences of State failure on public health emergencies 
are important. Failed States become reservoirs for diseases that can 
spread internationally, yet they are unable to cope with disease out-
breaks because they lack a working health system that can appropri-
ately sustain public health functions, prevent disease outbreaks, partici-
pate in disease eradication programs, and create conditions to reduce 
disease transmission and promote health for all. Further, diseases 
spread more easily as a result of a reduced effort and ability to control 
them. Dr. Brundtland took Ebola as an example and suggested that: 
So far it has been contained because it has been confined to 
small villages far from big cities. Health systems like that of 
Uganda have done a fine job in isolating patients and restrict-
ing spread. They could do this with the help of international 
specialists from WHO and [the Centers for Disease Control in] 
Atlanta because the security situation in the area was good. 
What if an outbreak takes place in a devastated Central African 
country where there is no local health care? What if the security 
situation was so bad that we could not send in international 
experts to advise and assist in containing the outbreak? What if 
infected people start fleeing into cities, to neighboring coun-
tries, and eventually out of the region?50 
It is indeed the risks that Dr. Bruntland envisages that need to be 
addressed. What can be done if an international health emergency 
occurs in a State that is incapable of controlling or dealing with it? 
Health emergencies in failed States are problematic not only for the 
particular States and their populations. They also present risks and 
challenges for the entire international community, which needs to be 
able to actively and effectively address global emergencies. It is there-
fore particularly important to assess the mechanisms that already exist 
and that can be usefully employed in response. At the same time, it is 
important to identify possible lacunae that need to be filled to face 
possible emergencies. 
49. See Brundtland, supra note 13, at 4. 
50. !d. at5. 
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Few strategies exist to support the health systems of failed and failing 
States, both at the international and national levels. Internationally, 
several international organizations have been mandated to address 
specific aspects of international health emergencies.51 Among these, 
WHO plays the main role in addressing public health emergencies. 
The role of WHO and of the international community in addressing 
public health emergencies is analyzed and appraised in the remaining 
sections of this Article. First, the Article addresses the role of WHO, 
and specifically two WHO mechanisms that address health emergen-
cies in failed and failing States: IHR 2005 and GOARN. Next, the 
Article explores mechanisms that other international organizations, 
such as UNICEF and OCHA, adopt to provide support in global health 
emergencies. 
IV. THE ROLE OF WHO IN ADDRESSING GLOBAL HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
WHO, the principle international organization dealing with global 
health, was created on April 7, 1948, and soon thereafter became the 
specialized UN agency for health issues. 52 WHO has 194 Member States 
and thus enjoys virtual universal membership.53 The WHO Constitu-
tion provides no mechanisms of withdrawal and no expulsion mecha-
nisms against Member States that do not behave according to its 
Constitution. 5 4 The main governing body ofWHO is the World Health 
Assembly, composed of delegates representing Member States. Addi-
tionally, the governing structure of WHO also includes a 34-member 
Executive Board elected by the World Health Assembly for a period of 
three years, a Secretariat headed by a Director-General, and ad hoc 
committees established by the Executive Board following a proposal by 
the World Health Assembly or the Director-General. 55 
51. These include WHO, UNICEF, and the World Bank. Nationally, several donor countries 
include funding for health emergencies in their emergency and humanitarian programs, which 
are mostly channeled through international organizations, like WHO, UNICEF, and other UN 
agencies. See Paeslee, supra note 24. 
52. See generally G. L. BURCI & C-H. VIGNES, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2004); C-H. Vignes 
and H. j. Schelzka, World Health Organization, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 
406-09 (Bernhardt ed., 1981); A. J. Peaslee, World Health Organization, in 3 INTERNATIONAL 
GoVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 449-51 (rev. 3d. ed., 1979); WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, www.who.int. (last visited july 17, 2013). 
53. Countries, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ /www.who.int/countries/en/ (last visited july 17, 
2013). 
54. BURCI & VIGNES, supra note 52. 
55. Governance, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ /www.who.int/governance/en/index.html 
(last visited july 17, 2013). 
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On a global scale, WHO 
plans and coordinates health actions on a global basis. At the 
request of members, it assists them in planning and carrying 
out health programs, strengthening their health services and 
training health workers. It promotes medical research and 
exchange of scientific information [and] makes health regula-
tions for international travel, keeps communicable disease un-
der constant surveillance, collects and disseminates data on 
health matters and sets standards for the quality control of 
drugs, vaccines, and other substances affecting health. It gives 
health assistance to members in emergencies or natural disas-
ters.56 
WH01s stated objective is "the attainment by all peoples of the 
highest possible level of health,"57 defined in the preamble of its 
Constitution as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being."58 Its role in global health emergencies is therefore fundamen-
tal. In fact, health is a dynamic concept and an "intrinsically complex 
and multi-faced topic, which straddles many areas of human activity 
and which has undergone a deep technical and philosophical evolu-
tion during the last few decades."59 
To reach its objective, WHO has both normative and directing 
powers.60 WHO can, inter alia, act as a coordinator and coordinating 
authority on international health work. Upon request, it assists govern-
ments in strengthening health services, and it facilitates the UN's 
provision of health services and assistance to special groups, such as the 
peoples of trust territories.61 Further, WHO can stimulate and advance 
work to eradicate epidemics, endemics, and other diseases; provide 
information, counsel, and assistance in the field of health; standardize 
56. Peaslee, supra note 52, at 450. 
57. Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 1 [hereinafter WHO Constitution], 
available at http:/ /apps.who.int/ gb/bd/PDF /bd4 7 /EN/ constitution-en. pdf. 
58. Id. 
59. BURGI & VIGNES, supra note 52, at 108. Health is also interlinked to many other basic 
issues, which are at the center of the international agenda, including economic and social 
development, human rights, children and women's rights, environment and food policies. 
60. "Normative powers" refer to the power to approve, through the World Health Assembly, 
specific regulations that are mandatory for Member States. By contrast, WHO's "directing powers" 
encompass policy directives that suggest, but do not require, that Member States undertake a 
certain course of action. See id. 
61. WHO Constitution, supra note 57, at art. 2(e). 
1360 [Vol. 44 
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
diagnostic procedures; and generally take all necessary action to attain 
its objective. 52 
WHO Member States have explicitly recognized the link between 
health and global security. In 2001, the World Health Assembly ap-
proved an important resolution on Global Health Security, which 
recognized that "any upsurge in cases of infectious disease in a given 
country is potentially of concern for the international community."63 
The resolution highlights a three-part strategy to address "global health 
security": (1) the development of specific programs for the prevention 
and control of known epidemic threats, such as influenza, meningitis, 
62. !d. at art. 2. The Article enumerates the functions of the Organization. The full Article 
states: "In order to achieve its objective, the functions of the Organization shall be: (a) to act as the 
directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work; (b) to establish and maintain 
effective collaboration with the United Nations, specialized agencies, governmental health 
administrations, professional groups and such other organizations as may be deemed appropriate; 
(c) to assist governments, upon request, in strengthening health services; (d) to furnish appropri· 
ate technical assistance and, in emergencies, necessary aid upon the request or acceptance of 
governments; (e) to provide or assist in providing, upon the request of the United Nations, health 
services and facilities to special groups, such as the peoples of trust territories; (f) to establish and 
maintain such administrative and technical services as may be required, including epidemiologi-
cal and statistical services; (g) to stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic and 
other diseases; (h) to promote, in co-operation with other specialized agencies where necessary, 
the prevention of accidental injuries; (i) to promote, in co-operation v.ith other specialized 
agencies where necessary, the improvement of nutrition, housing, sanitation, recreation, eco-
nomic or working conditions and other aspects of emironmental hygiene; (j) to promote 
co-operation among scientific and professional groups which contribute to the advancement of 
health; (k) to propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and make recommendations 
with respect to international health matters and to perform such duties as may be assigned thereby 
to the Organization and are consistent with its objective; (I) to promote maternal and child health 
and welfare and to foster the ability to live harmoniously in a changing total environment; (m) to 
foster activities in the field of mental health, especially those affecting the harmony of human 
relations; (n) to promote and conduct research in the field of health; (o) to promote improved 
standards of teaching and training in health, medical and related professions; (p) to study and 
report on, in co-operation with other specialized agencies where necessary, administrative and 
social techniques affecting public health and medical care from preventive and curative points of 
view, including hospital services and social security; (q) to provide information, counsel and 
assistance in the field of health; (r) to assist in developing an informed public opinion among all 
peoples on matters of health; (s) to establish and revise as necessary international nomenclatures 
of diseases, of causes of death and of public health practices; ( t) to standardize diagnostic 
procedures as necessary; (u) to develop, establish and promote international standards with 
respect to food, biological, pharmaceutical and similar products; (v) generally to take all necessary 
action to attain the objective ofthe Organization." !d. 
63. Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response, WHA 54.14, 54th World Health 
Assembly, May 21, 2001 [hereinafter Resolution WHA 54.14], available at http:/ /apps.who.int/ gb/ 
archive/pdf_files/WHA54/ea54r14.pdf. 
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or cholera; (2) the detection of and response to health emergencies 
that result from unexpected circumstances or unknown causes; and 
(3) improved preparedness through the strengthening of national 
infrastructures for disease surveillance and response.64 
Additionally, the resolution specifically requested that the Director-
General provide technical support to all Member States to develop 
intervention programs aimed at preventing epidemics and re-
sponding to the threats and emergencies of communicable disease, in 
particular with regard to epidemiological investigations, laboratory 
diagnoses, and the management of cases by the community and clinics. 
The resolution also requested that the Director-General make ap-
propriate arrangements to develop plans for regional preparedness 
and response. Finally, the resolution urged that the Director-General 
provide support to Member States to strengthen their capacity to 
rapidly detect and respond to threats and emergencies related 
to communicable diseases, especially by "developing the laboratory 
skills needed for diagnosis and providing training in epidemio-
logical methods for use in the field, particularly in the most exposed 
countries. "65 
Although under the WHO Constitution, Assembly resolutions are 
generally not binding legal instruments, the World Health Assembly 
determines the policies of the organization, and resolutions have a 
directive function. 66 Moreover, the strategy envisaged by the resolution 
is applicable in all health emergency situations and seems to be suited 
to deal with some situations arising from State failure. 
The implementation of the resolution relies on WHO's Epidemic 
and Pandemic Global Alert and Response Operations (GAR), which is 
the main operational tool to address global health security.67 GAR 
mainly operates through two important and interlinked instruments: 
the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) and the Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN).68 The following 
64. VIGNES & BURCI, supra note 52, at 141. 
65. Resolution WHA 54.14, supra note 63, 1 3. 
66. WHO Constitution, supra note 57, at art. 18. 
67. GAR responds to a series of diseases of international importance including: anthrax, 
avian influenza, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, dengue/dengue hemorrhagic fever, Ebola 
hemorrhagic fever, hepatitis, influenza, Lassa fever, Marburg hemorrhagic fever, Meningococcal 
disease, plague, Rift Valley fever, SARS, Smallpox, Tularaemia and yellow fever. See Pandemic and 
Epidemic Diseases, WoRLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ /www.who.int/csr/disease/en/ (last visited July 17, 
2013). 
68. Alert & Response operations, WoRLD HEALTH 0RG., http:/ /www.who.int/ csr /alertresponse/ 
en/ (last visited July 17, 2013). 
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sub-sections evaluate the functioning, successes, and challenges of 
these key public health emergency tools. 
A. The 2005 International Health Regulations Framework 
IHR 2005 is a key instrument for WHO's strategy to address global 
health security. It can also be an effective tool to assist States, includ-
ing failing States, in addressing health emergencies and preventing the 
international spread of infectious diseases. IHR 2005 built on the 
original IHR and must therefore be placed in its historical context to be 
properly understood.69 
1. The Original International Health Regulations 
In a rare use of its Article 21 normative powers/0 the World Health 
Assembly initially adopted the International Sanitary Regulations-the 
predecessor to IHR-by resolution on May 25, 1951.71 The regulations 
provided unique powers to WHO to act on specific infectious diseases 
in all Member States. Article 21 of the WHO Constitution gives the 
World Health Assembly unique normative powers to regulate interna-
tional disease control. 72 Through Article 21, the Assembly can adopt 
regulations concerning five specific areas, including "sanitary and 
quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent 
69. Historically, international coordinated actions to control the spread of certain infections 
predated the creation of WHO. In fact, when WHO was established, it inherited the responsibility 
of controlling the international spread of diseases from a series of international agreements and 
conventions dating back from the first International Sanitary Conference in Paris in 1851. 
Between then and the end of the century, eight conventions on the spread of infectious diseases 
across national boundaries were negotiated, and multilateral institutions were established to 
enforce these conventions, including the precursor to the present Pan American Health Organi-
zation. BuRCI & VIGNES, supra note 52, at 134-35; see also Peaslee, supra note 52, at 409-51. 
70. Article 21 has only been used twice. It was used the first time to adopt the 'Regulations 
Regarding Nomenclature' No. 1, on 22 May 1967. These Regulations deal with the harmonization 
of statistical classifications of morbidity and mortality by Members States following WHO rec-
ommendation for purpose of easier comparability. See Resolutions Regarding Nomenclature, 
20th World Health Assembly (May 22, 1967), http:/ /www.who.int/classifications/icd/docs/en/ 
NOMREGS.pdf. 
71. International Sanitary Regulations, WHA 4.75 (May 25, 1951), available at http:/ I 
whqlibdoc.who.int/trs/WHO_ TRS_ 41.pdf. 
72. Article 19 of the WHO Constitution also enumerates normative powers of the Health 
Assembly, which may adopt conventions or agreements in matter for which the organization is 
competent, such as the recently adopted Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, available at 
http:/ /www.who.int/tobacco/framework/ en/. See WHO Constitution, supra note 57, at art. 19. 
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the international spread of disease."73 Regulations are adopted by a 
simple majority within the Assembly74 and "come into force for all 
members after due notice has been given of their adoption by the 
Health Assembly except for such members as may notify the Director-
General of rejection or reservations within the period stated in the 
notice."75 Thus, all Member States are bound by the regulations once 
adopted, provided they have not expressly announced a reservation to 
them. 
Since its creation in 1948, WHO consolidated the diverse conven-
tions relating to public health, and at its Fourth Health Assembly in 
1951, adopted the International Sanitary Regulations, which consti-
tuted the "only international health agreement on communicable 
diseases that is binding on Member States. "76 The regulations declared 
that they replaced, between the parties, all earlier conventions and 
agreements.77 Their objective was "to ensure the maximum security 
against the international spread of diseases with a minimum interfer-
ence with world traffic."78 At first, they only covered the so-called 
"quarantinable diseases.'m The regulations were revised several times 
since 1948, mostly as a result of improved knowledge on epidemic 
73. The other areas are: (b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death and 
public health practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use; 
(d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and 
similar products moving in international commerce; (e) advertising and labeling of biological, 
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international commerce. !d. at art. 21. 
74. Article 60 of the WHO Constitution states: "(a) decision of the Health Assembly on 
important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. These 
questions shall include: the adoption of conventions or agreements; the approval of agreements 
bringing the Organization into relations with the United Nations and inter-governmental 
organizations and agencies in accordance with Articles 69, 70 and 72 [all relating to Relations with 
other Organizations]; amendments to this Constitution. (b) Decisions on other questions, 
including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds 
majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting. (c) Voting on analogous 
matters in the Board and in committees of the Organization shall be made in accordance with 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this article." /d. at art. 60. 
75. /d. at art. 22. 
76. David P. Fidler, International Law and Infectious Diseases 58-71 (1999) (citing Fidler, 
supra note 3 at 129). 
77. World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (1969) (3d ed. 1983) 
[hereinafter WHO, International Health Regulations]. 
78. /d. 
79. The quarantinable diseases were: plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, louse-borne 
typhus, and louse-borne relapsing fever. /d. 
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diseases.80 In 1969, the regulations were also renamed to the presently 
known IHR. 81 
Originally, IHR was a unique mechanism to control the interna-
tional spread of certain human diseases.82 It was an international legal 
instrument that was legally binding on all WHO Member States who 
had not rejected them or made specific reservations, as well as on all 
non-Member States that had agreed to be bound by them. Because 
WHO enjoys quasi-universal membership, IHR was widely applicable. 
IHR required Member States to notify WHO about any single case of 
plague or yellow fever occurring in humans in their territories. 83 In this 
context, IHR provided a powerful tool to the World Health Assembly to 
control the spread of certain epidemics. 
However, IHR mechanisms never truly developed the full potential 
of their legally binding status and did not prove to be effective in 
controlling the global spread of disease.84 First, Member States were 
reluctant to notify outbreaks of diseases subject to IHR.85 Certain 
Member States feared disproportionate reactions from other WHO 
Member States and their consequences on trade and tourism.86 Others 
were reluctant because of internal political reasons also linked to a 
perceived dishonor in experiencing disease outbreaks. 87 Finally, some 
Member States simply lacked the necessary surveillance systems re-
quired to recognize and report outbreaks under IHR. Second, IHR did 
not contain any enforcement provisions to ensure compliance.88 There 
are no available sanctions for failure to comply with binding regula-
80. For example, special provisional provisions relating to the Mecca pilgrimage were 
repealed in 1956. See BURCI & VIGNES, supra note 52, at 135. Also, for example, louse-borne typhus 
and louse-borne relapsing fever were removed from the scope of the list in 1969 because they were 
not considered to be a risk anymore. Following its eradication, smallpox was also removed from 
the regulation in 1981. WHO, INTER.NATIONAL HEALTH REGUlATIONS, supra note 77, at 5 (citing 
Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly Res. WHA34.13 (May 20, 1981)). 
81. !d. (citing Twenty-Second World Health Assembly, Res. WHA22.46 (July 25, 1969)). 
82. For an instructive overview ofiHR, see Global Capacities, Alert and Response, WoRLD HEALTH 
0RG., http:/ /www.who.int/csr/ihr/howtheywork/faq/en/print.html (last visited July 17, 2013). 
83. WHO, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGUlATIONS, supra note 77 ("WHO Member States are 
obliged to notify \\'HO for a single case of cholera, plague or yellow fever, occurring in humans in 
their territories, and give further notification when an area is free from infection."). 
84. See D.P. Fidler, International Law and Infectious Diseases 133 (1999); see also Burci & 
Vignes, supra note 52, at 137-39. 
85. BURCI & VIGNES, supra note 52, at 129-35. 
86. !d. 
87. !d. 
88. See Fidler, supra note 3, at 134 (adapted from D. P. Fidler, International Law and 
Infectious Diseases 58-71 ( 1999)). 
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tions approved under Article 21 of the WHO Constitution. Similarly, 
there is no enforcement provision within IHR beyond a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism for questions concerning its interpretation or applica-
tion.89 Third, some ofiHR's measures proved ineffective in preventing 
the spread of diseases. In 1968, even the WHO Deputy Director-
General himself observed that "the International Sanitary Regulations 
had failed to contain the international spread of cholera and smallpox-
two of the diseases then subject to those regulations."9° Fourth, in some 
cases, Member States overreacted to certain diseases by adopting 
excessive disease-control measures that were either prohibited by the 
regulations or not justified under the epidemiological circumstances of 
the time.91 For example, in the wake of the AIDS pandemic, some 
Member States imposed restrictive measures to travelers, such as requir-
ing them to carry certain health documents.92 This violates IHR 
regulations, but given the lack of enforcement provisions, WHO could 
take no action against these Member States. Fifth, IHR's scope was 
limited to controlling three diseases: yellow fever, cholera, and plague.93 
Member States have been reluctant to include new diseases on the list. 
In fact, while several diseases were removed from the list of the 
regulations, no new disease has ever been included.94 Historically, this 
choice was linked to the fact that these diseases are more likely to 
substantially affect international trade.95 Moreover, this choice could 
also be explained by the fact that IHR was first approved in 1948-and 
as indicated above, it has older historical roots-when little was known 
about other diseases that are now significant, and when the movement 
of people, goods, and pathogens was not as rapid as it is today. Thus, 
despite its great potential, IHR failed to provide a general effective 
mechanism to assist the international community in addressing global 
health emergencies and controlling the spread of disease. 
89. WHO, International Health Regulations, supra note 77, at 5. 
90. Fidler, supra note 3, at 133 (reported in D. P. Fidler, International Law and Infectious 
Diseases 58-71 (1999)). 
91. BURCI & VIGNES, supra note 52, at 137-39 (for example, these measures included travel 
restrictions). 
92. ld. at 138. Fidler also reports as an example of unnecessary health measures taken under 
IHR, the EU ban on Fish Exports from Countries in East Mrica during a cholera outbreak. See 
FIDLER, supra note 3, at 136-39. 
93. See supra notes 86, 93. 
94. For example, louse-borne typhus and louse-borne relapsing fever were removed from the 
scope of the list in 1969 and following its eradication, smallpox was removed from the regulation 
in 1981. Reg. WHA34.13 (May 20, 1981). 
95. BURCI & VIGNES, supra note 52, at 137-39. 
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The 2001 SARS epidemic highlighted weaknesses in the IHR sys-
tem and reinforced the need to revamp IHR by, among other things, 
focusing its provisions on general descriptions of diseases, rather than 
on lists of named diseases.96 In a resolution relating to the revision of 
IHR and adopted during the SARS emergency, the World Health 
Assembly urged the Director-General: 
To take into account reports from sources other than official 
notification, to validate these reports [on infectious diseases] 
according to established epidemiological principles; 
To alert, when necessary and after informing the government 
concerned, the international community to the presence of a 
public health threat that may constitute a serious threat to 
neighboring countries or to international health on the basis of 
criteria and procedures jointly developed with Member States. 
To collaborate with national authorities in assessing the severity 
of the threat and the adequacy of control measures and, when 
necessary, in conducting on-the-spot studies by a WHO team 
with the purpose of ensuring that appropriate control measures 
are being employed.97 
This recommendation was pivotal, as it recognized the importance of 
collaborating with non-State actors and the need to assess the adequacy 
of control measures implemented by national authorities. 
2. The 2005 International Health Regulations 
Recognizing IHR's limitations, the World Health Assembly re-
quested a revision of the regulations in 1995 by adopting the Resolu-
tion on the Revision and Updating of the International Health Regula-
96. The initial central purpose of IHR 2005 was to replace the list of diseases included in the 
IHR with the concept of "syndrome notification." The technical groups working on the IHR 
amendments first identified five syndromes that could cover all the diseases considered of public 
health importance. However, after undertaking a pilot project in twenty-two countries, it was 
found that syndromes were too difficult to report and could not be linked to pre-determined rules 
that could properly control the spread of infectious diseases. The syndrome-approach was 
therefore dropped and different approaches were pursued. /d. at 139. 
97. Revision of the International Health Regulations, Fifty-Sixth World Health Assembly 
Res. WHA56.28 (May 28, 2003), available at http:/ /www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA56/ 
ea56r28.pdf. 
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tions.98 The resolution aimed at reflecting the significant changes 
in disease patterns brought about by the emergence and re-emergence 
of disease, the advancement of medical science, and the changes in 
communications technology and shipping methods for goods and 
cargoes since the adoption of the previous version of the IHR in 1969.99 
Over the next decade, several WHO technical committees and the 
Committee on International Surveillance of Communicable Diseases 
worked on the development of a new set of IHR, which were initially 
adopted in 2005.100 InJune 2007, eighteen months after the notifica-
tion of its adoption, IHR 2005 became legally binding on all WHO 
Member States, except for those Member States that have rejected 
them or have submitted reservations. 101 If the World Health Assembly 
determines that the reservation is compatible with the object and 
purpose of IHR 2005, and it has not been objected to by at least 
one-third of the other Member States within six months of its notifica-
tion, the regulations enter into force for the reserving Member State, 
subject to the reservation. 102 Non-Member States of WHO may also 
notify the WHO Director-General that they agree to be bound by the 
regulations. 103 
States Parties were required to meet the requirements set forth in 
IHR 2005 as soon as possible, and no later than five years after the 
regulations' entry into force. 104 The implementation phase was divided 
into two parts. The first two years, until June 2009, focused on the 
assessment of existing national structures and resources and a develop-
ment of national plans of action. 105 The following three years, until 
June 2012, focused on the implementation of the plans of action, 
98. Revision and Updating of the International Health Regulations, Forty-Eighth World 
Health Assembly, Res. WHA48. 7 (May 12, 1995). 
99. See BURCI & VIGNES, supra note 52, at 139. For an American perspective on the new 
regulations, see International Health Regulations: Perspectives from the Region of the Americas, PAN AM. 
HEALTH 0RG., Aug. 1, 2004, available at http:/ /wwwl.paho.org/English/GOV /CD/cd45-12-e.pdf. 
100. For some negotiating insights, see World Health Organization, Regional Office for 
South-East Asia, The New International Health Regulations Revision Process, SEA/RC56/4 
(July 4, 2003); David P. Fidler, Revision of the World Health Organization's International Health 
Regulations, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 2004, available at http:/ /www.asil.org/insights/insigh132.htm. 
101. Revision of the International Health Regulations, arts. 59, 61, WoRLD HEALTH ORG. 
(May 23, 2005), available at http:/ /www.who.int/csr/ihr/WHA58-en.pdf [hereinafter IHR 2005]. 
102. I d. at art. 62. 
103. Id. at art. 59. 
104. About IHR, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ /www.who.int/ihr/about/en/index.html 
(lastvisitedjuly 17, 2013). 
105. See Global Capacities, Alert and Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ /www.who.int/csr/ 
ihr/capacity/en/index.html (last visited july 17, 2013). 
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specifically regarding national surveillance and response systems. 106 
During this period, States Parties were also required to implement 
the required actions at designated airports, ports, and certain ground 
crossings.107 In special circumstances, a two-year extension could be 
obtained, which would be followed by an additional two-year extension 
in extraordinary situations.108 
The purpose and scope of the regulations, stated in Article 2, are 
"to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health 
response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commen-
surate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid 
unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade."109 IHR 
2005 represents a significant step forward in WHO's ability to control 
and prevent health emergencies of an international nature by requir-
ing countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health 
events to WHO, and defining the rights and obligations of Member 
States to report public health events. It also establishes a number of 
procedures that WHO must follow in its work to support global public 
health security. no 
Importantly, the definition of public health emergency contained in 
Article 1 is more comprehensive than the one contained in the original 
IHR. It is identified as "an extraordinary public health event" deter-
mined by two concomitant elements. Such an emergency must "con-
stitute a public health risk to other States through the international 
spread of disease" and "potentially require a coordinated international 
response."111 This new definition of a public health emergency is of 
paramount significance. In fact, it addresses one of the main prob-
lems of the original IHR-i.e., its closed-list character-and it extends 
the application of IHR 2005 to a wide range of diseases, including 
those that are presently unknown. This definition covers all existing, 
new, and re-emerging diseases, including emergencies caused by non-
106. !d. 
107. !d. 
108. About IHR, WORLD HEALTH 0RG., http:/ /www.who.int/ihr/about/en/index.html (last 
visited july 17, 2013). The World Health Assembly reviewed the status of implementation of the 
IHR in its last general meeting in May 2012, finding that several Member States require further 
implementation actions. International Health Regulations (2005)--Summary of 2011 State Parties 
Report on !HR Core Capacity Implementation, WORLD HEALTH 0RG, Doc. WHO/HSE/GCR/2012.10, 
available at http:/ /www.who.int/ihr /publications/WHO_HSE_GCR_2012.1 O_eng.pdf 
109. IHR2005, supra note 101, at art. 2. 
110. "Wnat Are International Health Regulations?, WORLD HEALTH 0RG. (Apr. 8, 2008), http:/ I 
www.who.in t/features/ qa/39 I en/index.h tml. 
111. IHR 2005, supra note 101, at art. 1. 
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infectious disease agents. As such, it significantly enlarges the applicabil-
ity ofiHR, and thus overcomes one of the most important limitations of 
the original IHR, which was previously applicable only to three deter-
mined diseases. 
Moreover, the definition relies on two issues that have a large 
potential impact on the efficient coordination of responses in failed or 
failing States. First, a "public health emergency" must pose a risk to 
other States. Thus, the cross-boundary character of present-day health 
emergencies has become a central feature of IHR 2005. IHR 2005 is 
only applicable if the disease has the potential to spread internationally 
and poses a risk to other States. Second, the new definition also 
recognizes that a health emergency requires an international coordi-
nated response. This is further recognition that, increasingly, States 
cannot cope by themselves in health emergencies and need to coordi-
nate a response together. 
Furthermore, to analyze the relevance of an event as an international 
public health risk, a series of factors must be considered. These include 
geographical setting, time, size ofthe outbreak, closeness to an interna-
tional border or airport, speed of spreading, and mode of transmission. 
Article 12 provides the criteria by which the Director-General of WHO 
may, in consultation with the State Party concerned, determine the 
existence of a health emergency of international concern.112 
Annex 2 of the regulations provides States with an important deci-
sion instrument (a "decision tree" or algorithm) to assess events 
occurring in their territory. 113 The "decision tree" contains four crite-
ria: the seriousness of the public health impact of the event; the 
unusual or unexpected nature of the event; the risk of spread interna-
tionally; and/ or the risk that restrictions to international travel or trade 
may result because of the event.114 The occurrence of certain diseases, 
such as SARS, polio, and yellow fever, needs to be reported directly. 115 
However, when other unspecified and unknown diseases are found, the 
decision instrument is used. 116 
Once the conclusion is reached that the event qualifies as an 
112. /d. at art. 12. 
113. International Health Regulation (2005), Annex II Decision Instrument for the As-
sessment and Notification of Events that May Constitute a Public Health Emergencies of 
International Concern, WHA58.3, available at http:/ /www.who.int/csr/ihr/WHA58-en.pdf; IHR 
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international public health risk, the State must notify WH0.117 On the 
basis of the information received, the Director-General of WHO deter-
mines whether the event constitutes a public health emergency of 
international concern. 118 If the State Party in whose territory the event 
is taking place is in agreement with the determination, the Director-
General can then seek the views of a special Emergency Committee for 
appropriate temporary recommendations. 119 If the State Party does not 
agree within 48 hours, the Emergency Committee hears the views of 
the State Party and makes recommendations to the Director-General, 
who is responsible for the final decision.120 Thus, in addition to 
providing mechanisms that bolster WHO's ability to control and pre-
vent international health emergencies, the new framework is also a 
significant step forward in terms of applying legally binding measures 
to international situations that qualify as health emergencies and that 
can become a public risk. 
The new regulations require all States to notify WHO of any event 
that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern 
within twenty-four hours of the event.121 Importantly, States must re-
spond to WHO's requests for verification of information regarding 
health emergency events so that appropriate technical collaboration 
in such emergencies can be ensured and, if necessary, other States can 
be informed of the public health risks which may require their atten-
tion.122 
Further, each State is required to establish national IHR focal points 
to ensure continuous contact with WHO, which must be known to all 
States. 123 In the event of a health emergency, States must respond to 
public health risks that might spread internationally.124 States must 
also provide the public health rationale and scientific justification for 
any additional measures that significantly interfere with international 
traffic. 125 
WHO Member States have also agreed to provide routine inspection 
and control activities at international airports, ports, and some ground 
117. !d. 
118. IHR 2005, supra note 101, at art. 12. 
119. !d. at arts. 12, 48. 
120. Id. at arts. 12, 49. 
121. !d. at art. 6. 
122. !d. at art. 10. 
123. !d. at art. 4. 
124. !d. at art. 15. 
125. !d. at art. 43. 
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crossings, to prevent international disease transmission. 126 States are, 
furthermore, bound to develop, strengthen, and maintain the capacity 
to detect and report health emergencies, as defined by IHR 2005.127 
Fundamentally, the new regulations enhance WHO's role in global 
health emergencies. In the event of an emergency, WHO itself may 
recommend measures to be adopted by States affected by a public 
health emergency of international concern, other States, and operators 
of international transport. 128 WHO can also assist all Member States in 
assessing and controlling outbreaks, thus increasing the credibility of 
each Member State's response. 129 
WHO may make temporary recommendations on an ad hoc, time-
limited, risk-specific basis.130 WHO can also produce standing recom-
mendations, which indicate the appropriate measures to be applied for 
specific ongoing public health risks at certain international airports, 
ports, and ground crossings for routine or periodic application. These 
can be directed at persons, baggage, cargo, containers, ships, aircraft, 
road vehicles, goods, or postal parcels. 131 
The effectiveness of IHR 2005 was put to the test during the 2009 
HlNl flu pandemic, the first Public Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern (PHEIC). HlNl is a novel strain of influenza A virus, 
which first emerged in Mexico in March 2009. 132 The virus quickly 
spread to 46 countries and caused more than 90 deaths. 133 The 
Director-General of WHO determined that the HlNl outbreak con-
stituted a PHEIC on April 25, 2009, as provided by IHR 2005.134 The 
Director-General convened an Emergency Committee and consulted 
the affected States.135 The Emergency Committee was tasked with 
proposing the issuance, modification, extension, or termination of 
126. !d. at arts. 19, 20, Annex I. 
127. !d. at art. 13. 
128. !d. at arts. 12, 15. 
129. !d. at art. 12. 
130. !d. at art. 15. 
131. !d. at art. 16. 
132. V. Trifonov et al., Geographic Dependence, Surveillance, and Origins of the 2009 
Influenza A (HlN1) Virus, 361 NEWENG.J. MED. 115-19 (2009). 
133. Rebecca Katz, Use of Revised International Health Regulations During Influenza A (HJNJ) 
Epidemic, 2009, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Aug. 2009, http:/ /wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/ 
article/15/8/09-0665_article.htm. 
134. !d.; see also Global Alert and Response: Influenza A (HJNJ)-Update 38, WORLD HEALTH 0RG. 
(May 25, 2009), http:/ /www.who.int/ csr I don/2009_05_25/ en/. 
135. Katz, supra note 133. 
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measures to mitigate the consequences of the PHEIC.136 The Emer-
gency Committee met frequently and continuously shared information 
with national IHR focal points and Member States, which by and large 
followed WHO's recommendations.137 A Review Committee was estab-
lished to review the implementation of the new IHR 2005 in the HlNl 
crises.138 It concluded that IHR 2005 advanced the protection of global 
health and helped the world to better prepare for public health 
emergencies, and that WHO generally performed well during the 
pandemic.139 The Committee concluded, however, that the world was 
still "ill-prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any 
similarly global, sustained and threatening public-health emergency."140 
Importantly, the Committee concluded that "the most important struc-
tural shortcoming of the IHR is the lack of enforceable sanctions" 
because there are no legal consequences if a country fails to act or does 
not explain why it adopted measures that were different from those 
recommended by WH0.141 
IHR 2005 undoubtedly represents a major step forward in control-
ling the global spread of disease. The double-pronged definition of 
international health emergency is important: it can encompass all 
international threats and is based on the risk that it may cause to other 
States. It is also important that one of the definition's requirements 
is that the outbreak potentially necessitates a coordinated interna-
tional response. This highlights the importance of a common reaction. 
Moreover, States must nominate focal points and must respond to 
WHO's requests for information on possible health emergencies. The 
Director-General's power to issue temporary recommendations is simi-
larly very important and novel. 
However, as with any international agreement, IHR 2005 represents 
a consensus among WHO Member States of a balance between their 
sovereign rights and a shared commitment to prevent the international 
spread of disease. The compromise between these conflicting interests 
permeates the regulations. First, similar to IHR, IHR 2005 does not 
136. !d. 
137. !d. 
138. Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): Report of the Review 
Committee on the Function of the International Health Regulations (2005) in Relation to 
Pandemic (HIN1) 2009, WORLD HEALTH 0RG, Doc. A64/10, 5 May 2011, 1l'l! 15-25, available at 
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include any enforcement mechanism that may be used against a State 
that fails to comply with IHR 2005 provisions. Although there are soft 
mechanisms that may stimulate compliance, there are no mandatory 
tools to ensure compliance with the regulations. 142 Second, IHR 2005 
contains no provisions that allow WHO to act upon an emergency in 
the absence of State action. Thus, only State Members that already have 
a working health system will be able to participate fully within the IHR 
2005 system. The establishment of national focal points may be rel-
evant, especially coupled with a State's obligation to respond to WHO 
requests for verification of information regarding health emergency 
events. However, the absence of enforcement mechanisms undermines 
the stringency of the rule. Third, IHR 2005 is still only focused on 
monitoring, rather than intervening in, health situations, and WHO 
can only issue recommendations for the adoption of measures by the 
State Party experiencing the public health emergency of international 
concern or by other States Parties. 143 
Despite these limitations, IHR 2005 also includes three interesting 
new tools that may be of particular use to failed and failing States. First, 
in making its assessment of health emergencies, WHO can take into 
account reports other than notifications or consultations. 144 Such 
reports are likely to include reports of organizations that are active on 
the ground, and could probably be useful. Second, before taking 
action based on such reports, WHO needs to consult and attempt to 
obtain verification from the State Party concern.145 During the verifica-
tion stage, WHO can offer to collaborate with the State Party con-
cerned in assessing the emergency.146 If the State Party does not accept 
the offer of collaboration, WHO may, if the magnitude of the emer-
gency justifies it, share the information with other States Parties, thus 
142. Indeed, compliance mechanisms are based on "peer pressure." The WHO notes: 
"although the IHR (2005) dot not include an enforcement mechanism per se for States which fails 
to comply with its provisions, the potential consequences of non-compliance are themselves a 
powerful compliance tool. Perhaps the best incentives for compliance are "peer pressure" and 
public knowledge. With todays' electronic media nothing can be hidden for very long. States do 
not want to be isolated. The consequences of non-compliance may include a tarnished interna-
tional image increased morbidity/mortality of affected populations, unilateral travel and trade 
restriction, economic and social disruption and public outrage." Frequently Asked Questions About the 
International Health Regulations (2005), WoRLD HEALTH 0RG. 3, available at http:/ /www.who.int/ 
ihr/about/FAQ2009.pdf. 
143. IHR (2005), supra note 101, at art. 15. 
144. /d. at art. 9. 
145. /d. 
146. /d. at art. 10. 
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allowing them to react. 147 Third, and finally, it is for the Director-
General to determine the existence of a global health emergency.148 
The Director-General can also issue temporary recommendations to be 
implemented by other States also, not only by the State that experi-
ences the emergency. 149 
Generally, however, the applicability of the IHR 2005 framework in 
failed or failing States is likely to be limited. It will depend substantially 
on how IHR 2005 is implemented and the role that the Director-
General will take. In fact, as seen above, Article 15 of IHR 2005 gives the 
Director-General the power to issue temporary recommendations to 
act on health emergencies, even in the absence of State approval. 
Whether and how the Director-General will implement this provision 
will be of key importance to successfully managing health emergencies 
in failed and failing States. The remaining issue, however, is that the 
notification of health emergencies must still originate from Member 
States. 150 
B. The Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
The second instrument created by WHO to deal with global out-
breaks of disease is GOARN. 151 GOARN is the product of technical 
collaboration between 110 institutions and networks, 152 known as 
technical partners, that combine human and technical resources with 
the goal of rapid identification, confirmation, and response to out-
breaks of international importance.153 GOARN creates an operational 
framework that links those with relevant expertise and skills for the 
purpose of keeping the international community alert of any threat of 
147. /d. 
148. /d. at art. 12. 
149. /d. at art. 15. 
150. /d. at Annex I. 
151. For a description of the Network and of its history, see WHO Department of Com-
municable Disease Surveillance and Response, A Framewark for Global Outbreak Alert and Response, 
WoRLD HEALTH ORG. WHO/CDS/CSR/2000.2, available at http:/ /www.who.int/csr/resources/ 
publications/surveillance/whocdscsr2002.pdf. 
152. Member institutions include WHO and UNICEF, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; as well as 
several NGOs, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres and the International Rescue Committee, as well 
as scientific institutions in Member States, regional networks and laboratories. For more infonna-
tion on members, see Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ I 
www.who.int/ csr I outbreaknetwork/ en/ (last visited july 17, 20I 3). 
153. /d. 
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outbreaks in order to be prepared to respond. 154 GOARN is a more 
comprehensive and flexible instrument than the IHR; moreover, it can 
be applied in conjunction with IHR, as it covers the three original IHR 
diseases and operates under the new IHR 2005 regime. Furthermore, 
GOARN complements IHR 2005 by facilitating coordination of global 
health emergency responses on the ground. 
GOARN was derived from WHO's non-binding directing and coordi-
nating powers.155 GOARN was implemented pursuant to the Global 
Health Security resolution, in which the World Health Assembly ex-
pressed its support for the "collaboration between WHO and all 
potential technical partners in the area of epidemic alert and response, 
including relevant public sectors, intergovernmental organizations, 
non-governmental organizations and the private sector."156 GOARN 
also directs the Director-General to provide technical support to all 
Member States for the development of intervention programs to' 
prevent and strengthen their capacities in responding to threats and 
emergencies from epidemics and communicable diseases. 157 This reso-
lution is fundamental in the effort to control the spread of diseases. 
First, it recognizes the importance of collaboration with technical 
partners, including NGOs. Second, it mandates the Director-General 
to strengthen WHO's assistance to Member States in matters of epi-
demic prevention and control. Toward these ends, WHO provides the 
secretarial service for GOARN, which is guided by a Steering Commit-
tee. WHO also coordinates international outbreak response through 
the use of resources from within the network. 
154. ld. 
155. "Generally, WHO has preferred to set norms or standards by non-binding recommenda-
tions which entails a duty of members to report on any action taken." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Pusuc 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 409-09 (Bernhardt ed.). The coordinating and directing powers of WHO are 
enshrined in Article 2 of the WHO Constitution, which affirms that, "in order to achieve its 
objective, the functions of the Organization shall be: (a) to act as the directing and coordinating 
authority on international health work." WHO Constitution, supra note 57, at art. 2. Article 23 and 
62 of the WHO Constitution further give the World Health Assembly the power to issue 
recommendation and gives Member States the duty to report on their actions with respect to the 
recommendations. /d. at arts. 23, 62. Article 23 reads: "The Health Assembly shall have authority 
to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the 
Organization." I d. at art. 23. Article 62 monitors the implementation of the recommendations. I d. 
at art. 62. It states: "Each Member shall report annually on the action taken with respect to 
recommendations made to it by the Organization and with respect to conventions, agreements 
and regulations." ld. 
156. WoRLD HEALTH AssEMBLY, 54.14, 'l1(3), available at http:/ /www.amun.org/final/03/ 
WHA_II_l. pdf. 
157. Id. '13(4). 
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1. Key Features of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
One of GOARN's goals is the development of standards for inter-
national epidemic response. Through these standards, GOARN strives 
to combat the international spread of disease outbreaks, including all 
of the diseases included in the GAR strategy and the three IHR dis-
eases/58 to ensure that affected States receive appropriate technical 
assistance rapidly; and to contribute to long-term epidemic prepared-
ness and capacity building. GOARN has agreed on several operational 
protocols that standardize epidemiological, laboratory, clinical manage-
ment, research, communications, logistics support, security, evacua-
tion, and communications systems. 159 Additionally, GOARN has devel-
oped a set of Guiding Principles for International Outbreak Alert and 
Response, aimed at "improv[ing] the delivery of international assis-
tance in support of local efforts by partners in the Global Outbreak 
Alert and Response Network, and seek[ing] to promote the highest 
standards of professional performance in the field." 160 
The Guiding Principles for International Outbreak Alert and Re-
sponse provide detailed standard operating protocols on how to re-
spond to and evaluate outbreaks of disease of international impor-
tance, coordinate field activities, and secure international support. 161 
They provide that WHO should ensure that outbreaks of potential 
international importance are rapidly verified and information is quickly 
shared within the Network. An Operational Support Team should then 
coordinate a rapid response to the requests for assistance from States 
affected by the outbreak. 162 Next, the most appropriate experts should 
reach the field in the least possible time to carry out coordinated and 
effective outbreak control activities. 163 This international team is ex-
pected to integrate and coordinate activities to support national efforts 
158. The diseases included in the GAR strategy are: anthrax, Avian influenza, Crimean-
Congo haemorrhagic fever, dengue/dengue haemorrhagic fever, Ebola haemorrhagic fever, 
hepatitis, influenza, Lassa fever, Marburg haemorrhagic fever, meningococcal disease, plague, 
Rift Valley fever, SARS, smallpox, tularaemia and yellow fever. See supra note 67. 
159. Global Outbreak Alert & Response Netwa>k, WORLD HEALTH 0RG., http:/ /www.who.int/csr/ 
outbreaknetwork/en/ (last visited july 17, 2013). 
160. Guiding Principles fa> International Outbreak Alert and Response, WoRLD HEALTH 0RG., 
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and existing public health infrastructure.164 The principles also recog-
nize the unique role of national and international NGOs in the area of 
health, including in the control of outbreaks.165 Finally, the principles 
recognize that the GOARN responses will proceed with full respect 
for ethical standards, human rights, national and local laws, cultural 
sensitivities, and traditions.166 These principles are general, but they 
have been implemented to address disease breakouts in a number of 
countries, including several failed States. GOARN has lent its support 
to the delivery of international assistance and to local efforts in Mghani-
stan, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Republic of the 
Congo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.167 
A key feature of GOARN is the Global Alert and Response Team 
(GART), which is in charge of assessing the epidemiological signifi-
cance of any reported outbreak and deciding whether any action is 
needed. The team is made up of members from WHO Country 
Offices, WHO sub-regional Response Teams, WHO Regional Offices, 
the Alert and Response Operations Centre team in Geneva, and disease 
specialists.168 Every day, in Geneva, GART deals with reports of pos-
sible outbreaks and reports of unknown diseases.169 Once verified, the 
reports of disease outbreaks are reported in widely accessible publica-
tions.170 
GART developed six criteria to assess the seriousness of the reports 
for global health: first, whether the disease is unknown; second, the 
potential for its spread beyond national borders; third, the seriousness 
of the health impact or of unexpectedly high rates of illness or death; 




167. Global Alert and Response: Containing Outbreaks in the Field, WoRLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ I 
www. who.in t/ csr I alertresponse/ field/ en/index.html (last visited July 17, 2013). 
168. Global Alert and Response: Event Vmfication, WoRLD HEALTH 0RG., http:/ /www.who.int/ 
csr I alertresponse/verification/ en/ (last visited July 17, 2013). 
169. !d. 
170. These publications include the WHO Outbreak Verification List (OVL), a weekly 
publication targeted to public health professionals with information on verified or under-
verification diseases outbreaks of international public health importance so that timely actions 
can be taken; the Disease Outbreak News, which provides public information about officially 
confirmed outbreaks of international importance; and the Weekly Epidemiological Record, 
which covers epidemiological information on cases and outbreaks of diseases under the IHR and 
also on other communicable diseases of public health importance. See Information Management and 
Dissemination, WoRLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ /www.who.int/csr/alertresponse/infomanagement/ 
en/print.html (last visited July 17, 2013). 
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fifth, the strength of national capacity to contain the outbreak; 
and, sixth, whether the disease is a suspected accidental or deliberate 
release. 171 
The second and last criteria are especially relevant in situations of 
health emergencies in failing States. The fact that the seriousness 
of a report is assessed based on its potential of spreading beyond 
national borders clearly emphasizes GOARN's focus on global, rather 
than localized, emergencies. Similarly, the assessment of the strength 
of national capacity to contain the outbreak signals that WHO antici-
pates the possibility that the State will be incapable of handling the 
· outbreak and is willing to intervene. Once the seriousness of an 
outbreak is confirmed, WHO provides targeted technical advice and 
supplies to the affected States. 
2. GOARN's Effectiveness in Global Health Emergencies 
Through GOARN, WHO can coordinate investigations and re-
sponses to global health emergencies. 172 The SARS outbreak provided 
an important testing ground for the efficacy of WHO's capabilities. 
First, the initial unofficial reports of an unknown disease in China were 
received and verified through GOARN. 173 Second, GOARN proved to 
be a readily available instrument to control the epidemics, and the 
effort to control the epidemics was coordinated in part through 
GOARN. 174 Its role in successfully dealing with the epidemics was 
recognized by the health community: in May 2003, the World Health 
Assembly approved a resolution on SARS, requesting the Director-
General "to strengthen the function of WHO's Global Outbreak Alert 
and Response Network."175 Moreover, in another resolution approved 
in the same session, the Assembly requested that the Director-General, 
in the revision process of IHR, take into account reports from sources 
other than official notifications and to collaborate with national authori-
ties to assess the adequacy of their control measures.176 Importantly, 
these resolutions demonstrate the Assembly's support of GOARN's 
activities and methodologies. 
171. Global Alert and Response: Event Verification, WoRLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ 
csr / alertresponse/verification/ en/ (last visited July 17, 2013). 
172. Id. 
173. Global Alert and Response: The Operational Response to SARS, WoRLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 16, 
2003), http:/ /www.who.int/ csr /sars/ goarn2003_ 4_16/ en/. 
174. ld. 
175. Revision of the International Health Regulations, supra note 97, '[ 2. 
176. ld. 
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In 2012, GOARN reported eighty-four alerts. 177 For example, in 
October 2012, GOARN reported an outbreak of Ebola in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo. The alert reported forty-nine cases of Ebola 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, of which twenty-four were fatal. 
The report details that 
[t]he Ministry of Health ... continues to work with partners, 
under the National Task Force to identify all possible chains of 
transmission of the illness and ensure that appropriate mea-
sures are taken to interrupt transmission and stop the outbreak. 
The task force includes [Medecins Sans Frontieres, the Interna-
tional Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, US 
Agency for International Development, US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, and the United Nations Children's 
Fund and WH0.178 
The report confirmed that samples were tested by the Uganda 
Virus Research Institute and that the CDC had established a field 
laboratory in Isiro, where the cases were reported, in the beginning of 
the outbreak.179 The Public Health Agency of Canada also provided 
support on rapid diagnosis in the field with their mobile laboratory 
facilities. 180 
On the same day, a report was also issued providing updates on the 
outbreak of cholera in Sierra Leone that had affected twelve of its 
thirteen districts since the beginning of2012. The update noted that: 
With support from national and international partners and 
donors, including [UNICEF, Oxfam, British Red Cross, Save 
the Children, Care, Concern, Medecins Sans Frontieres, UK 
Department of International Development, OCHA, Interna-
tional Rescue Committee, and WHO], the Ministry of Health 
and Sanitation has scaled up the response particularly in the 
177. Global Alert Response: 2012, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/archive/ 
year/2012/en/index.hunl (last visited July 17, 2013). 
178. Global Alert and Response: Ebola Outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo-Update, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 8, 2012), http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2012_10_08a/en/index.hunl. 
179. /d. 
180. /d. 
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areas of coordination of the overall response, surveillance and 
case management. 181 
The two cases exemplify the different options available to GOARN 
members to confirm and react to a disease outbreak. They also confirm 
the international efforts surrounding attempts to isolate the spread of 
highly contagious communicable diseases. 
Interestingly, GOARN's activities also play a role in the implemen-
tation of IHR 2005. For example, at the beginning of May 2008, 
China. reported the outbreak of hand, foot, and mouth disease due 
to enterovirus 71 in Fuyang City. 182 The outbreak resulted in several 
thousands of cases, of which about twenty were fatal. 183 On May 21, 
2008, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, in 
collaboration with the WHO Representative Office in China, released a 
preliminary report on the outbreak, which stated that" [a]s part of the 
efforts to implement [IHR 2005,] China will further strengthen the 
early warning system by immediate notification of clustering of clini-
cally abnormal and severe cases, as well as [the] increasing interna-
tional collaboration and information exchange"184 made available via 
GOARN. 
GOARN has also shown its viability in failed States, where support 
from the State is completely lacking. For example, it has dealt with 
several outbreaks arising out of Somalia, although the security situation 
raised concerns during its operations. In january 2007, WHO reported 
that there were 114 suspected cases, including fifty-one deaths, of Rift 
Valley Fever in Somalia.185 Several actors were involved in the process 
of detection, confirmation, and containment: one case was confirmed 
by laboratory analysis in the Kenyan Institute of Medical Research and 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) International Emerging Infec-
181. /d.; Global Alert and Response: Cholera in Sierra Leone-Update, WoRLD HEALTH 0RG. 
(Oct. 8, 2012), http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2012_10_08/en/. 
182. The first outbreak report is Global Alert and Response, Entmrvirus in China, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (May 1, 2008), http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2008_05_01/en/index.html. Two further up-
dates were also issued on May 7, 2008, available at http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2008_05_20/en/ 
index.html, http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2008_05_ 07 /en/. 
183. /d.; Global Alert and Repvnse: Enterovirus in China-Update 2, WoRLD HEALTH 0RG. 
(May 21, 2008), http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2008_05_21/en/index.html. 
184. /d. 
185. Global Alert and Response: Rift Valley Fever in Kenya, Somalia and the United Republic 
of Tanzania, WoRLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2007), http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2007_05_09/en/ 
index.html. 
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tious Program in Kenya.186 Medecins sans Frontieres facilitated the 
transport of samples, and the WHO country office held training ses-
sions with Somali medical officers on how to detect and contain the 
disease.187 However, it was reported that the deteriorating security 
situation hampered control measures in the affected area.188 
In 2002, Somalia's Ministry of Health reported an outbreak of 
meningitis, later confirmed by the WHO Collaborating Centre for 
Reference and Research on Meningococci at the National Institute of 
Public Health in Oslo.189 As a result of the outbreak, a crisis committee 
was set up by the Ministry of Health, the Somali Red Crescent Society, 
Medecins sans Frontieres, UNICEF, and WHO. The committee 
strengthened surveillance and prepared a mass vaccination cam-
paign.190 The campaigns vaccinated 67,681 people in the first few 
weeks. 191 
Again, on May 2, 2000, WHO reported 2,232 confirmed cases of 
cholera in certain regions of Somalia. 192 WHO carried out cholera 
control coordination activities through the cholera task force, whose 
membership includes UNICEF, Action Contre la Faim Internationale, 
the International Medical Corps, Medecins sans Frontieres, the Coordi-
nating Committee of the Organization for Voluntary Services, and the 
Somali Red Crescent Society.193 
These examples demonstrate that GOARN is often able to provide 
effective assistance in cases of disease outbreak and to control the 
spread of disease. Although it is based on a voluntary mechanism, 
GOARN is effective in reporting, managing, and to a certain extent, 
controlling the spread of disease even in failed States, where health 
systems are dysfunctional or nonexistent. Moreover, the fact that 
reports are assessed on the basis of a national health system's capability 
186. !d.; Global Alert and Response, Rift Valley Froer in Kenya and Somalia-Update 3, WoRLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 31, 2007), http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2007_01_31/en/. 
187. !d. 
188. Global Alert and Response: Rift Valley Fever in Kenya, Somalia and the United Republic 
of Tanzania, WoRLD HEALTH 0RG. (May 9, 2007), http:/ /www.who.int/csr/don/2007_05_09/ 
en/index.html. 
189. 2002-Meningococcal Disease in Somalia-Update, WoRLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 18, 2002), 
http:/ /www.who.int/ csr I don/2002_01_18/ en/print.html. 
190. !d. 
191. 2002-Meningococcal Meningitis in Somalia-Update 1, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 28, 
2002), www.who.int/csr/don/2002_01_28/en/index.html. 
192. 2000-Cholera in Somalia, WORLD HEALTH 0RG. (May 20, 2000), http:/ /www.who.int/ csr I 
don/2000_05_02/ en/ print.html. 
193. !d. 
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to contain outbreaks ensures that proper action is taken in situations 
of State failure. However, as highlighted above, deteriorating security 
situations also play a role in the ability to control the spread of diseases 
in failed States. 
GOARN is a flexible system based on collaboration between national 
and international health care professionals. The assistance provided by 
GOARN depends upon the threat that the disease outbreak poses to 
the international community and to international travel and trade, the 
knowledge of the specific disease, the seriousness of the health impact, 
and the viability of the affected national health system. If a State is 
capable of controlling and reporting disease outbreaks, it will do so. 
Otherwise, WHO's personnel in the field or other health care profes-
sionals may also report the outbreak. WHO can also coordinate the 
response, if possible, with the competent health ministry. 194 WHO and 
GOARN may take a larger role insofar as the national authorities do 
not possess the required expertise and capacity to control the outbreak. 
This "elastic" solution seems to be particularly fitting for failed States. 
Nonetheless, GOARN has some important limitations. The main 
drawback is that it is based on a voluntary system of coordination and is 
not a legally binding instrument. This means that it does not contain 
enforcing measures. Thus, for example, GOARN was powerless during 
the SARS epidemic until China let the inspection team into its territory. 
One can argue, however, that GOARN has been effective in many 
circumstances precisely because it is based on a loose relationship 
between different actors, which are not competing against each other. 
GOARN's strength is based on the fact that its membership is varied, 
and includes governmental and non-governmental actors and interna-
tional organizations. Moreover, GOARN's members primarily include 
health professionals, not politicians or negotiators. As such, it does not 
threaten to hurt sovereignty sensibilities. 
V. OTHER INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS GLOBAL HEALTH 
EMERGENCIES IN SITUATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN CRISES 
In addition to the WHO instruments, humanitarian programs pro-
vide another broad and general mechanism to support the health 
systems of failed and failing States. Failed and failing States are often 
also conflict countries or countries with severe humanitarian needs. 
194. See Guiding Principles for International Outin"eak Alert and Response, WoRLD HEALTH 0RG., 
http:/ /www.who.int/ csr I outbreaknetwork/ guidingprinciples/ en/index.html (last visited july 17, 
2013). 
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The international community, and particularly the UN, has created 
important mechanisms of intervention in such situations. Spe-
cifically, OCHA and UNICEF are particularly active in health emer-
gencies. 
In situations of humanitarian crisis, OCHA, a special office of the UN 
Secretariat, coordinates all operations by UN agencies that provide 
health and protective services, food, shelter and other on-the-ground 
humanitarian assistance in fifty countries in Mrica, Asia, Europe, and 
the Americas. 195 These coordinated interventions have become a funda-
mental mechanism for delivering health care in failed and failing 
States, as they provide targeted support to populations in need. Equally, 
they are a mechanism by which the international community can 
ensure that certain health standards are maintained. 
UNICEF is also active in health emergencies in crisis situations, with 
several projects on the ground. UNICEF is mandated to ensure the 
protection of children, and has also created a special program for its 
activities in "Countries in Crises."196 The program is specifically tar-
geted toward countries in emergencies that are undergoing a particu-
lar critical period. UNICEF's stated goal is to reach the most vul-
nerable in humanitarian crises, where access to vulnerable populations 
is often delayed because of inaccessibility, armed combat, or weather 
conditions.197 To do so, UNICEF identified five organizational priori-
ties: girls' education, early childhood, immunization, the fight against 
HIV I AIDS, and protection from violence, abuse, exploitation, and 
195. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA), This Is OCHA 
(2010), available at http:/ I ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OCHA_Brochure_Eng_2012.pdf. 
196. UNICEF includes in its countries in crises program the following countries: Mghani-
stan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Caribbean, Central Mrican Republic, Central· Amer-
ica, Chad, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, DPR Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Indian Ocean Tsunami, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Northern Caucasus 
(Russian Federation), occupied Palestinian territory, Peru, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Southern Mrica, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Uganda, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. See 
UNICEF in Emergencies, UNICEF, http:/ /www.unicef.org/emerg/index_fieldreports.html (last 
visited july 17, 2013). 
197. UNICEF affirmed that and noted that "the consequences (of such emergencies) are 
usually devastating, leaving entire communities deprived of the most basic assistance and 
protection. Most of those who die in wartime, for instance, do not die as a direct result of violence 
but from the loss of basic health services, food, safe water or adequate sanitation. This is especially 
true for children. The countries with the highest rates of preventable deaths among children are 
countries which have experienced protracted periods of armed conflict: India, Nigeria, China, 
Pakistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia." /d. 
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discrimination. 198 UNICEF's activities in emergency situations vary. For 
example, in October 2012, UNICEF announced the expansion of its 
operations within Syria and in the countries affected by the Syrian crisis 
to assist with growing needs. 199 UNICEF estimated that there are one 
million children affected by the conflict inside Syria, and that so far, 
more than one hundred thousand Syrian children have been displaced 
to other countries in the region, including Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, 
and Iraq.200 
Although humanitarian programs cannot provide all of the services 
of an effective health system, they are important interventions by 
the international community in crisis countries. These efforts provide 
preliminary and targeted support to national health systems. They are 
critical in guaranteeing a minimum standard of health to populations 
living in situations of State failure. They also provide an opportunity for 
the international community to monitor the situation of certain health 
indicators and, if necessary, provide the necessary means to counter 
possible crises and threats. 
VI. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAY FORWARD 
Global public health emergencies have become a major concern and 
an important part of the security policies of many States. This Article 
examined the instruments available to the international community to 
control the spread of infectious diseases and health emergencies, 
focusing on failed and failing States, which are particularly ill-equipped 
to combat the spread of disease because their health systems are 
typically non-functioning. 
WHO primarily carries out its role as the main actor in the interna-
tional arena dealing with health emergencies through IHR 2005 and 
GOARN. This Article has assessed advantages and limitations of each of 
198. Basic Education and Gender Equality: UNICEF Priorities, UNICEF, http:/ /www.unicef.org/ 
education/bege_61625.html (last visited July 17, 2013). These priorities are the same in both 
humanitarian and developmental situations. Id. Moreover, UNICEF also developed a Core 
Commitments for Children in Emergencies (CCCs) specifically targeting children. See UNICEF 
in Emergencies & Humanitarian Action: Commitments, UNICEF, http:/ /www.unicef.org/emerg/ 
index_commitments.html (last visited july 17, 2013). 
199. UNICEF, Syria's Children: A Lost Generation? Crisis Report March 2011-March 2013 
(March 2013) [hereinafter UNICEF, Syria's Children], http:/ /www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/ 
Syria_2yr_Report.pdf; see also UNICEF in Emergencies & Humanitarian Action: UNICEF Required 
US$900 million to Meet the Needs of Children and Women Worldwide, UNICEF (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http:/ /www.unicef.org/emergencies/index_66202.html. 
200. UNICEF, Syria's Children, supra note 199. 
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these two instruments. IHR 2005 is an important binding legal instru-
ment, but the lack of an enforcement mechanism threatens to under-
mine its strength in the absence of State cooperation. GOARN repre-
sents a new model of global governance: it is a non-binding collection 
and verification instrument that involves the collaboration of field 
personnel from international organizations and NGOs, and has be-
come an effective and powerful mechanism to address global health 
emergencies. Despite their shortcomings, these instruments have proven 
to be effective in some situations. 
The fundamental question that remains to be addressed is what the 
international community can do in the absence of State cooperation 
or capacity to perform. Uniquely, under the new IHR 2005, WHO's 
Director-General can issue temporary recommendations to respond to 
a trans-boundary health emergency, even in the absence of Member 
State agreement. However, IHR 2005 assumes that Member States have 
the core capacity to report and notify health emergencies through a 
national focal point. The extent to which GOARN can provide informa-
tion about health emergencies to the Director-General is key to guaran-
teeing a coordinated and prompt action in the absence of State 
control. Used symbiotically, IHR 2005 and GOARN can ensure a 
coordinated response to health emergencies in failed and failing 
States. It is key to continue to monitor the situation and to provide 
WHO with the appropriate tools and support. As always, the devil is in 
the details. 
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